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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Nora Colleen Washburn appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding
her guilty of Insurance Fraud. On appeal, Washburn argues the district court erred when it
denied her motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29, erred when it
overruled her objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument and abused its discretion when it
ordered her to pay restitution.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On January 2, 2016, Washburn was driving a large suburban on Government Way and
rear-ended a car being driven by Dean Crook. (See 6/21/17 Tr., p. 71, L. 14 – p. 72, L. 24, p. 73,
Ls. 15-20, p. 154, Ls. 10-25, p. 81, L. 21 – p. 82, L. 25; p. 159, L. 10 – p. 160, L. 5.) Washburn
“basically climb[ed] onto the back” of Mr. Crook’s car and pushed it into a snowbank. (6/21/17
Tr., p. 71, L. 14 – p. 73, L. 14, p. 82, Ls. 14-20.)
From April 2015 to November 2015 Washburn had car insurance through Progressive
Insurance Company. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 88, L. 13 – p. 90, L. 4.) Washburn’s car insurance was
cancelled on November 7, 2015. (Id.) When, on January 2, 2016, Washburn rear ended Mr.
Crook, Washburn did not have car insurance. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 154, Ls. 10-25, p. 159, L. 10 p.
160, L. 5.)
A few days after the crash, Progressive Insurance received a claim from Mr. Crook for the
accident. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 90, L. 11 – p. 91, L. 3, p. 103, L. 3 – p. 107, L. 25; Ex. 7.) Progressive
denied this claim because Washburn did not have car insurance. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 116, L. 5 – p.
120, L. 4; Exs. 8-10.)
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On January 29, 2016, Washburn called Progressive Insurance and got car insurance again.
(6/21/17 Tr., p. 92, Ls. 4-23.) Then on February 5, 2016, Washburn called Progressive and
claimed that she had an accident on February 1, 2016. (See 6/21/17 Tr., p. 120, L. 10 – p. 122, L.
12; Ex. 11.) When the agent asked Washburn what was a good number to reach her, Washburn
provided a phone number with a “208” area code. (See Ex. 11 at 0:38 to 0:50, 5:05 to 5:12.)
Washburn told the agent that she was located in Idaho. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 121, Ls. 10-12; see also
Ex. 11 at 0:57 to 1:03.) She also provided an Idaho address for the policy. (See Ex. 11 at 1:35 to
1:46.) Washburn told the agent that she was driving on Government Way on February 1, 2016,
and rear-ended “Dean.” (See Ex. 11 at 2:00 to 5:01, 5:39 to 8:01.)
Progressive investigated Washburn’s claim and determined it was the same claim made
by Dean Crook for the accident on January 2, 2016. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 113, L. 9 – p. 116, L. 12, p.
134, L. 20 – p. 139, L. 21; Exs. 12-14.) On February 12, 2016, as part of the investigation, a
Progressive investigator called Washburn. (See 6/21/17 Tr., p. 134, L. 20 – p. 137, L. 15; Ex.
12.) Despite being confronted with evidence that this accident occurred in January, Washburn
continued to claim the accident occurred on February 1, 2016. (See Ex. 12.)
Progressive referred the case to a fraud investigator with the Idaho Department of
Insurance. (R., pp. 7-9.) The state charged Washburn with Insurance Fraud. (R., pp. 37-38.)
The case proceeded to jury trial. (R., pp. 64-74.)
At trial the state introduced in evidence a recording of Washburn’s February 5, 2016, call
to Progressive wherein Washburn claimed the accident occurred in February. (See 6/21/17 Tr.,
p. 120, L. 10 – p. 122, L. 12; Ex. 11.) During the call, Washburn said she was located in Idaho.
(6/21/17 Tr., p. 121, Ls. 10-12; see also Ex. 11 at 0:57 to 1:03.)
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Elena Wells, an investigator for Progressive Insurance, testified that she investigated
Washburn’s insurance claim. (See 6/21/17 Tr., p. 134, L. 20 – p. 137, L. 8; Ex. 12.) Ms. Wells
called Washburn on February 12, 2016, at which time Washburn continued to insist the accident
occurred in February. (Id.) Ms. Wells recorded the conversation and the recording was admitted
into evidence. (See id.)
Deputy Leyk testified that, on March 24, 2016, he spoke with Washburn about the
accident. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 154, L. 3 – p. 157, L. 19; Ex. 15.) Washburn admitted to Deputy Leyk
that she did not have insurance on January 2, 2016. (Id.) Deputy Leyk issued Washburn a
citation for failure to have car insurance. (Id.) Washburn was eventually found guilty of not
having insurance on January 2, 2016. (Id.)
At trial, Washburn conceded that she made a false statement to an insurance agency.
(6/21/17 Tr., p. 162, L. 7 – p. 165, L. 6.) Washburn only argued that she did not make the false
statement when she was in Idaho. (Id.)
In closing argument, the state argued that Washburn made the false statements in Idaho
because during the February 5th call she said she was located in “Idaho” and there was
circumstantial evidence that she was at home during the calls. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 168, L. 7 – p. 176,
L. 6.) The state argued that it had proven the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
(See id.)
Washburn argued in closing that the crime occurred during the two phone calls, one on
February 5th and then again on February 12th. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 176, L. 13 – p. 185, L. 20.)
Washburn argued that the state did not provide proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Washburn
was standing in Idaho when those two phone calls occurred. (Id.) In response, the state argued
the jury was only to consider the evidence admitted at trial, and there was no evidence that
3

showed Washburn was outside of Idaho during these phone calls. (6/22/17 Tr., p. 189, L. 11 – p.
193, L. 6.) Washburn objected to this argument, and the district court overruled Washburn’s
objection. (6/22/17 Tr., p. 189, L. 6 – p. 190, L. 10.) The state again explained that it had to
prove all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the evidence admitted at trial.
(6/22/17 Tr., p. 190, L. 12 – p. 191, L. 15.) The jury found Washburn guilty of Insurance Fraud.
(6/22/17 Tr., p. 197, L. 22 – p. 200, L. 2; R., p. 100.)
Washburn filed a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29.
(R., pp. 101-102.) Washburn argued that “the State failed to present legally sufficient evidence
that Ms. Washburn was in the State of Idaho when she made the phone calls at issue.” (Id.) The
district court held a hearing on motion for judgment of acquittal. (R., p. 109.)
Washburn argued that her statement that she was “located” in Idaho was ambiguous and
therefore the state did not “present legally sufficient evidence to show where Ms. Washburn was
when she made these phone calls and they simply invited the jury to speculate that maybe she
was in Idaho, that she was in Idaho when they were made.” (7/6/17 Tr., p. 207, L. 3 – p. 208, L.
17.) The state responded that Washburn’s response was not ambiguous and there was no
evidence that she was not in Idaho. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 208, L. 21 – p. 210, L. 24.)
The district court denied Washburn’s Rule 29 motion. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 211, L. 2 – p. 215,
L. 20; see also R., pp. 110-111.) The district court found, in part, “[i]n reviewing the evidence
that was presented at trial, this Court finds that there were [sic] both direct and circumstantial
evidence that support the jury’s finding on each element of the offense charged in this case.”
(7/6/17 Tr., p. 213, Ls. 4-7.)
Both Progressive Insurance and the Department of Insurance sought restitution for costs
and expenses incurred as a result of Washburn’s insurance fraud. (R., pp. 116-117; 10/12/17 Tr.,
4

p. 228, Ls. 3-11.) At sentencing, Washburn asked the court for more time before responding to
the restitution request. (10/12/17 Tr., p. 235, Ls. 10-15.) The district court ordered Washburn to
pay $4,721.11 in restitution. (10/12/17 Tr., p. 239, Ls. 6-9; R., pp. 118-119.) The district court
entered judgment and sentenced Washburn to four years, with one and one-half year fixed. (R.,
pp. 125-130.) The district court retained jurisdiction. (Id.) Washburn timely appealed. (R., pp.
131-135.)
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ISSUES
Washburn states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err by denying Ms. Washburn’s motion for judgment
of acquittal because the State’s evidence was insufficient to support the
jury’s guilty verdict?

II.

Did the State violate Ms. Washburn’s due process rights because the
prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Ms. Washburn to pay
restitution because the State did not present sufficient evidence to support
its restitution request?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Washburn failed to show the district court erred when it denied her motion
for judgment of acquittal because the state introduced sufficient evidence to sustain the
conviction?
2.
Has Washburn failed to show the district court erred when it overruled her
objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument because the prosecutor was properly arguing that
the jury should only consider the evidence introduced at trial?
3.
Has Washburn failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
awarded restitution pursuant to the restitution statutes?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Washburn’s Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Washburn’s motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho

Criminal Rule 29. (See 7/6/17 Tr., p. 211, L. 2 – p. 215, L. 20.) The district court determined
that there was both direct and circumstantial evidence that Washburn was in Idaho when she
committed Insurance Fraud. (See id.) On appeal Washburn disagrees with the district court’s
determination and argues the evidence submitted to the jury was not sufficient to prove that
Washburn was in Idaho when the crime was committed. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)
Contrary to Washburn’s appellate argument there was sufficient evidence, especially when
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that she was in Idaho when she
committed the crime. This includes, but is not limited to, the direct evidence that when the
insurance agent asked Washburn where she was located, she responded “Idaho.” (See 6/21/17
Tr., p. 121, Ls. 10-12; see also Ex. 11 at 0:57 to 1:03.)

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court may enter a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29 only

if the court finds the evidence “insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.”
State v. Clark, 161 Idaho 372, 374, 386 P.3d 895, 897 (2016) (citing I.C.R. 29(a)). “In reviewing
the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must independently consider
the evidence in the record and determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the
defendant’s guilt as to such material evidence of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable
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doubt.” Id. (quoting State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006)). The Idaho
Supreme Court explained the relevant inquiry:
The relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant to be
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether “after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (citing State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012)(emphasis original)).

C.

Washburn Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied Her Motion For
Judgment Of Acquittal Because The State Presented Substantial And Competent
Evidence That She Committed The Offense In Idaho
The district court ruled that the state presented sufficient evidence to the jury to establish

all of the elements of the crime, including that Washburn committed the insurance fraud while
she was in Idaho. (See 7/6/17 Tr., p. 211, L. 2 – p. 215, L. 20.) On appeal Washburn argues that
the district court erred because she contends “the State did not meet its burden to prove Ms.
Washburn was in Idaho during the February 5 and February 12 phone calls with Progressive.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) She argues that, “[a]though Ms. Washburn stated she was ‘located’ in
Idaho, this statement did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was physically present in
Idaho while making the phone call.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) Washburn has failed to show the
district court erred. The district court applied the correct standard and found the state introduced
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.
The jury was instructed that to find Washburn guilty of Insurance Fraud the state was
required to prove that:
1.
2.
3.
4.

On or between February 5, 2016 and February 12, 2016;
in the state of Idaho;
the defendant, Nora Washburn;
did with the intent to defraud or deceive;
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5. present or cause to be presented to an insurer, a false or altered statement
material to an insurance transaction.
(R., p. 89.)
Washburn conceded all of the elements of the crime, except that she committed the crime
while she was in the state of Idaho. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 162, L. 7 – p. 165, L. 6.) The jury was
instructed that “[a]ny offense committed by use of a telephone...may be deemed to have been
committed at the place from which the telephone call...was made...or the offense may be deemed
to have been committed at the place at which the telephone call...was received.” (R., p. 91.)
There was substantial evidence that Washburn made the February 5, 2016 call while she
was in Idaho and that she also received the February 12, 2016 call when she was in Idaho. Ms.
Wells, an investigator for Progressive Insurance, testified that letters were sent to Washburn’s
home address in Idaho, and when Washburn reported the false claim she said she was located in
Idaho:
Q. Okay. So the first one that was sent out on January 20th, was that sent to an
address in Idaho?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, on February 5th, when Ms. Washburn called, and Jacqueline
asked her – what did she ask?
A. What state are you located in?
Q. And what was her response?
A. Idaho.
Q. Where did – where was Ms. Washburn’s address when she signed up for a
new insurance policy on January 29th of 2016? What state?
A. Idaho. It was an Idaho policy.
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Q. And her second denial letter, shortly after she was denied in less than a month
after she got her new insurance policy, where was that denial letter sent?
A. In Idaho.
Q. Okay. And when you were speaking to Ms. Washburn on February 12th of
2016, on that 18 minute call we just listened to, you asked her for photos; right?
A. I did.
Q. She said she couldn’t send them because she was where?
A. At home.
(6/21/17 Tr., p. 149, L. 7 – p. 150, L. 7.) Washburn’s home address was in Idaho. (6/21/17 Tr.,
p. 150, Ls. 16-19.)
It was during these two phone calls that Washburn made the false insurance claims. (See
Exs. 11-12.) The district court considered all of the evidence at trial, including both the phone
calls and the circumstantial evidence regarding Washburn’s location in Idaho.
In this case evidence presented to the jury established from the defendant’s
own statement when asked where she was located, she responded “Idaho”. Even
if that evidence had not been presented to the jury, there is substantial
circumstantial evidence that the jury could also consider in deciding whether or
not the call was either placed or received in Idaho.
The jury was provided evidence that the defendant, at the time of the
accident, was driving in Idaho. The defendant was driving in Idaho in January of
2016. The defendant was a customer of a local Idaho insurance agency prior to
January 2nd, 2016, and after January 29th, 2016. Among the exhibits submitted in
trial were the claim denial letters which were sent to the defendant’s Idaho
address. The witnesses also testified that it was the insurance company’s policy to
ask where the person was calling from which was consistent with the recording
that was admitted. At least one of the statements on the recording or one of the
recordings was that the defendant indicated she had to go to work to e-mail
documents to the insurance company.
The jury could certainly reasonably infer from that that she was at home in
Idaho when that statement was made on the telephone.
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Evidence was presented that the insurance company representative called
the defendant from their office in Ohio. The jury could also have inferred it
would be very unlikely that they would make a direct call to a work telephone
number and the jury could reasonably infer that the number called was a home
telephone number.
Exhibit A was admitted by the defense. Exhibit A had a work number
listed as well as an Idaho home address and an Idaho telephone number, using a
208 area code. The work number that was listed on Exhibit A had a 509 area code
which is commonly known to be an eastern Washington area code.
The jury had the opportunity and was presented with the argument,
choosing to – between this conflicting evidence. In this case, the jury resolved
that possible conflict in favor of the State and against the defendant and was able
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the communication was made or
received within the State of Idaho based on the direct statement of the defendant,
as well as a circumstantial evidence that can be presented – that was presented.
I do find that there is sufficient evidence upon which a rationale trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
I will deny the motion for entry of a Judgment of Acquittal.
(7/6/17 Tr., p. 213, L. 19 – p. 215, L. 20.)
Washburn’s primary argument on appeal is that her response of “Idaho” when asked her
location was “vague and ambiguous.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) As an initial matter, it is
not ambiguous. When asked for your location, responding with “Idaho” is very clear.
Further, even if it was ambiguous, the Rule 29 standard requires the court to consider the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. See Clark, 161 Idaho at 374, 386 P.3d at
897. Thus, even if it was an ambiguous response, that ambiguity has to be resolved in favor of
the prosecution. The district court properly considered the evidence submitted at trial and found
both direct and circumstantial evidence, that when considered in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, was sufficient to prove that Washburn was in Idaho on either or both of the February
5th and 12th telephone calls. Washburn has failed to show the district court erred.
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II.
The District Court Did Not Err When It Overruled Washburn’s Objection To The Prosecutor’s
Closing Argument That The Jury Should Only Consider The Evidence Introduced At Trial
A.

Introduction
At trial, Washburn argued that she could have been in Washington when she committed

insurance fraud. (See 6/21/17 Tr., p. 176, L. 13 – p. 185, L. 20.) In response the prosecutor
argued that there was no evidence introduced at trial that indicated Washburn was anywhere but
Idaho when she committed insurance fraud.

(6/22/17 Tr., p. 189, L. 6 – p. 190, L. 10.)

Washburn objected and the district court overruled the objection. (Id.) On appeal Washburn
argues the district court erred, claiming that the prosecutor’s argument impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof and amounted to misconduct.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-13.) Washburn’s

argument fails and the district court did not err.
The prosecutor’s closing argument was based upon the jury instructions and the evidence
introduced at trial. (See 6/22/17 Tr., p. 189, L. 6 – p. 190, L. 10; R., pp. 79-80.) The argument
also was a permissible response to Washburn’s closing argument that she could have possibly
been in Washington during the phone calls. The district court did not err when it overruled
Washburn’s objection. Even if the district court erred, the error was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On appeal, the standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends

on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant objects to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at
trial, the appellate court need not engage in the fundamental error analysis. Severson, 147 Idaho
at 720, 215 P.3d at 440 (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)).
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Instead, the appellate court utilizes a two-part test for misconduct, “which asks whether the
conduct was proper and, if not, whether it was harmless error.” Id. (citing Field, 144 Idaho at
571, 165 P.3d at 285). “Where the defendant meets his initial burden of showing that a violation
occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a
reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967)).

C.

Washburn Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred And Has Failed To Show The
Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During Closing Argument
Washburn argues the district court erred when it overruled her objection because she

claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by shifting the burden of proof on the jurisdictional
element of the crime. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-13.) Washburn argues, “The prosecutor’s
argument – that no evidence showed Ms. Washburn was outside of Idaho – misrepresented the
State’s burden of proof and shifted the burden of proof to the defense.” (Appellant’s brief, p.
12.) Washburn’s argument is not supported by the law or the record.
During closing argument the state argued that there was evidence to show that Washburn
was in Idaho during the two phone calls. (See 6/21/17 Tr., p. 168, L. 7 – p. 176, L. 6.) In part
the state argued:
Now, in the State of Idaho. We talked about this and I’ll just touch on it
again briefly. Location. Where her address is. The conversation she had with
Jacqueline stating that, ‘I’m located in Idaho. I can’t send you the pictures
because I’m at home. I’ll send ‘em to you when I get to the office.’
We all know where her home is. We have letters to prove it. Granted the
earlier one was after insurance had lapsed so maybe she doesn’t live there
anymore. But the letter in February less than a month after she got her insurance
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policy? I think it’s reasonable to assume that that’s her address. So when she’s
saying she’s at home, she’s talking about that address in Idaho.
(6/21/17 Tr., p. 173, L. 23 – p. 174, L. 11.) The state argued that it had proven the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (See 6/21/17 Tr., p. 168, L. 7 – p. 176, L. 6.)
In response, Washburn argued that the state did not provide proof, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Washburn was standing in Idaho when those two phone calls occurred. (6/21/17 Tr.,
p. 176, L. 13 – p. 185, L. 20.) Washburn argued that “Ms. Wells never asked Ms. Washburn,
‘Where are you calling from?’ She never asked her, ‘Where are you right now?’ She never
asked anything like that.” (6/21/17 Tr., p. 179, Ls. 22-24.) She argued that during the February
12th phone call Washburn never said she was at home.

(6/21/17 Tr., p. 180, Ls. 8-23.)

Washburn argued that during the February 5th phone call, Washburn’s response that she was
“located” in Idaho was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was physically
in Idaho during the phone call. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 180, L. 24 – p. 183, L. 1.) Washburn argued that
because the state line is closer in Kootenai County than in Boise, there existed a reasonable doubt
about whether Washburn was in Idaho at the time of the calls. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 183, L. 8 – p. 184,
L. 2 (“Has the State shown beyond a reasonable doubt that she was not right over that boarder
[sic] when she made the phone call? I think the circumstances are a bit different up here than
they are in Boise.”).)
In its reply, the state responded to Washburn’s argument by reading a jury instruction that
instructed the jury it was only to consider the evidence admitted at trial, and arguing there was no
evidence submitted at trial that showed Washburn was outside of Idaho during these phone calls.
(6/22/17 Tr., p. 189, L. 11 – p. 193, L. 6.)
[PROSECUTOR]: So just to follow-up on a couple of points [defense
counsel] spoke about yesterday. I’ll start off by comments [defense counsel] made
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about sticking to the law. That’s what I want to do with you right now. Let’s
stick to the law.
First, the Judge read you the Information. It was one count. So the State
only needs to prove in one of the two main instances we’re discussing, either on
February 5th or February 12th, that all those elements were met.
Now, I want to read to you jury Instruction No. 3, the third paragraph,
because I want to stick to the law. It states precisely, “The State must prove the
alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Not any reasonable doubt. Not all
reasonable doubt as [defense counsel] stated yesterday. A reasonable doubt.
That paragraph continues to say this: “A reasonable doubt is not a mere
possibility or imaginary doubt.” Let that sink in for a moment while I read you
jury Instruction No. 4 one sentence. “In determining the facts, you may consider
only the evidence admitted in this trial.”
What evidence suggests it’s outside of Idaho? That Ms. Washburn was
outside of Idaho? None. Nothing was admitted that suggests she was outside of
Idaho.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m gonna object, Your Honor. It’s not
defense’s burden to prove anything in this case and I object to the State’s
suggesting that we had the burden to prove anything.
THE COURT: Overruled.
(6/22/17 Tr., p. 189, L. 6 – p. 190, L. 10.) The state then argued that Defense Exhibit A, which
contained two phone numbers for Washburn, one with a 208 area code and another with a 509
area code, did not show that Washburn was not in Idaho during the two phone calls. (6/22/17
Tr., p. 190, L. 12 – p. 191, L. 15; Ex. A.) The state again explained that it had to prove all of the
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the evidence admitted at trial. (Id.)
Where do we know she lives? You have the evidence. I’m not gonna tell
you that. You know that. You’ve heard all the evidence. You’ve seen the
testimony. You’ve watched the video. You heard the audio. You know that
information. And again, only the evidence that has been admitted in this trial is
the evidence you can consider.
Now let’s think about everything we just covered. You have the five
elements of this crime. Jury Instruction No. 9. [Defense counsel] and Ms.
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Washburn conceded four out of those five elements. It’s still the State’s job to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all five elements and we did that for all five
elements.
(6/22/17 Tr., p. 192, Ls. 9-21.)
The district court properly overruled Washburn’s objection. And on appeal Washburn
has failed to show the district court erred because the prosecutor’s argument did not shift the
burden of proof, was not misconduct and did not impact her right to a fair trial. “A defendant’s
right to a fair trial is impacted ‘[w]here a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial,
including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.’” State v. Parker, 157
Idaho 132, 145, 334 P.3d 806, 819 (2014) (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979). “It
is improper to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument.” State v.
Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871, 332 P.3d 767, 783 (2014) (quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125,
133, 294 P.3d 1137, 1145 (Ct. App. 2013)).

“Misconduct may occur by the prosecutor

diminishing or distorting the state’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Felder, 150 Idaho 269, 274, 245 P.3d 1021, 1026 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations
omitted). Generally the parties are given wide latitude in making closing arguments to the jury
and discussing the evidence and inferences that can be made therefrom. State v. Montgomery,
163 Idaho 40, 47, 408 P.3d 38, 45 (2017) (citing Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440).
“The line separating acceptable from improper advocacy is not easily drawn; there is often a gray
zone.” Id. (quoting State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 721, 264 P.3d 54, 62 (2011)). “In reviewing
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must keep in mind the realities of trial.” Id.
(quoting State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 62, 253 P.3d 727, 736 (2011)). A fair trial is not
necessarily a perfect trial. Id. (citing Ellington, 151 Idaho at 62, 253 P.3d at 736).
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Here the prosecutor’s argument was specifically based upon Jury Instruction Nos. 3 and
4. (See 6/22/17 Tr., p. 189, L. 6 – p. 190, L. 10; see also R., pp. 79-80.) The prosecutor read
from Jury Instruction No. 3 that “[t]he State must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (See id.) The prosecutor then read from Jury Instruction No. 4 which stated, “[i]n
determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial.” (Id.) The
prosecutor then pointed out that there was no evidence admitted in trial that showed Washburn
was outside of Idaho. (Id.) This was proper argument. Nothing argued by the prosecutor
suggested that Washburn had the burden to prove anything at trial, nor did the prosecutor argue
the state did not have the burden to prove all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g.,
State v. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246, 252-53, 335 P.3d 586, 592-93 (Ct. App. 2014) (“The prosecutor
merely argued a permissible inference arising from the trial evidence—that Rocha did not
perform a breath test because he did not want to reveal his breath alcohol level, and that Rocha’s
awareness that he would incur administrative penalties for that refusal bolstered the inference.”).
Here, the prosecutor’s argument was based upon the law and the evidence at trial. There was no
misconduct.
Further, this argument was in response to Washburn’s closing argument wherein she
argued that Washburn could have been in Washington during the phone calls. (See 6/21/17 Tr.,
p. 178, L. 19 – p. 185, L. 20.) Washburn argued:
You’re here today to determine whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ms. Washburn was in Idaho as opposed to Washington or any other
state, but I’m gonna focus on Washington, when these phone calls were made.
(6/21/17 Tr., p. 179, Ls. 9-14.) Washburn argued, in part, that because Kootenai County is close
to Washington a reasonable doubt existed as to Washburn’s whereabouts when she made the
false statements at issue in this case. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 183, L. 2 – p. 185, L. 20.)
17

Now, the reason this issue even really comes up in this case, it’s kind of because
we do live in Kootenai County. We’re right on the boarder [sic] of Washington.
Eight minutes that way is a different state and an Idaho jury cannot convict
someone of a crime that happened eight minutes away.
(6/21/17 Tr., p. 183, Ls. 2-7.) Washburn then asked the jury to examine Exhibit A because it
showed she had a “509” area code for her work number. (See 6/21/17 Tr., p. 184, L. 24 – p. 185,
L. 3.)
It was reasonable for the prosecutor to respond to Washburn’s argument that she could
have been in Washington during the phone calls by pointing out that none of the evidence
introduced at trial supported the defense’s speculation. It is not error to point out the deficiencies
in the defense’s argument. See, e.g., State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 445, 348 P.3d 1, 60
(2015) (the prosecutor’s argument properly “highlighted to the jury that the defense presented no
alternative explanation as to why Abdullah would drive to Boise that night”); State v. Norton,
151 Idaho 176, 189, 254 P.3d 77, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) (“We conclude that the prosecutor’s
rebuttal argument referring to some of defense counsel’s arguments as red herrings and smoke
and mirrors was not misconduct.”) The prosecutor’s argument that the evidence introduced at
trial pointed to Washburn being in Idaho and that there was no evidence to contradict that was
proper closing argument and not misconduct.

D.

Even If The District Court Erred, The Error Was Harmless Because The Result Of The
Trial Would Have Been The Same
The district court properly overruled Washburn’s objection. However, even if the district

court erred, that error was harmless because it did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. See Perry,
150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. Here, Washburn conceded all of the elements of the crime,
except that she committed the crime while she was in the state of Idaho. (6/21/17 Tr., p. 162, L.
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7 – p. 165, L. 6.) As described above, there was substantial evidence that Washburn was in the
state of Idaho when she committed insurance fraud. This includes, but is not limited to, the fact
that Washburn admitted she was located in Idaho during the February 5, 2016, call. (Ex. 11 at
0:57 to 1:03.) Further, the jury was instructed that the state had to prove all of the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including that it was committed in the State of Idaho. (See
R., pp. 80-81, 89.) There is no reason to believe that the jury disregarded these jury instructions.
The jury is presumed to follow the district court’s instructions. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871, 332
P.3d 767, 783 (2014) (citing State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011)). The
prosecutor’s argument that there was no evidence Washburn was in another state would not have
contributed to the jury’s verdict. There was no error, and even if there was error it was harmless.

III.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution
A.

Introduction
Both Progressive Insurance and the Department of Insurance investigation section sought

restitution for costs and expenses incurred as a result of Washburn’s insurance fraud. (See R.,
pp. 116-117, 120-124.) The district court ordered restitution in the amount of $4,721.11. (R.,
pp. 118-119.) Washburn argues that the district court acted inconsistently with legal standards
and abused its discretion when it ordered restitution because she argues the restitution statutes do
not cover these costs and expenses. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-19.) Washburn’s argument on
appeal fails.
Washburn never raised this argument before the district court and this Court should not
consider it on appeal. (See 10/12/17 Tr., p. 235, Ls. 10-15.) Even if this Court considers
Washburn’s argument, the restitution statutes allow both Progressive Insurance and the
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Department of Insurance investigation section to recover these costs and expenses. See I.C.
§§ 41-291(8), 41-293(4), 41-295(6). The district court acted consistently with applicable legal
standards and did not abuse its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“‘Whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court’s discretion

and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7).’” State
v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919, 393 P.3d 576, 579 (2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v.
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011); State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43
P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002)).

In determining whether the district court has abused its

discretion, the appellate court considers “whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with relevant legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (citing
Swallow v. Emergency Med. Of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003)).

C.

Washburn Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Ordered Her To Pay Restitution
Washburn argues the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution because

she argues “the restitution statutes for insurance fraud do not permit restitution for prosecution
costs or costs to the insurance company for its processing of the fraudulent claim.” (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 13-19.) Washburn argues that the district court “failed to act consistently with the
relevant legal standards by awarding restitution outside the scope of the statute and unsupported
by evidence.” (Id.) This Court should decline to consider Washburn’s appellate argument
because she did not raise the argument below. Alternatively, Washburn’s argument on appeal
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fails because the district court’s award of restitution was based upon evidence submitted by the
state and complied with the restitution statutes and therefore was consistent with relevant legal
standards.
The jury found Washburn guilty of Insurance Fraud, a violation of Idaho Code § 41-293.
(6/22/17 Tr., p. 197, L. 22 – p. 200, L. 2; R., pp. 100, 125-130.) Idaho Code § 41-293 provides
that anyone found guilty under this section “shall be ordered to make restitution to the insurer or
any other person for any financial loss sustained as a result of a violation of this section.” I.C.
§ 41-293(4).
(4) Any violator of this section is guilty of a felony and shall be subject to a term
of imprisonment not to exceed fifteen (15) years, or a fine not to exceed fifteen
thousand dollars ($15,000), or both and shall be ordered to make restitution to the
insurer or any other person for any financial loss sustained as a result of a
violation of this section. Each instance of violation may be considered a separate
offense.
I.C. § 41-293(4). The investigation section of the Department of Insurance is also permitted to
seek restitution for the cost of investigation for individuals successfully prosecuted under Idaho
Code § 41-293. I.C. § 41-295(6).
(6) The investigation section shall be permitted to seek court ordered restitution as
reimbursement, for the cost of investigation from those individuals successfully
prosecuted under section 41-293, Idaho Code. Any restitution payments received
pursuant to this section shall be deposited in the insurance administrative account
as provided in section 41-401, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 41-295(6).
Further, Idaho Code § 19-5304 permits victims who suffer economic loss as the result of
the defendant’s criminal conduct to seek restitution from the defendant. See I.C. § 19-5304.
“Economic loss” includes “direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses.” I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a).
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In compliance with these statutes the state submitted an affidavit outlining the costs of
investigation and sought restitution for those costs. (See R., pp. 116-117; 10/12/17 Tr., p. 228,
Ls. 3-11.) The affidavit provided sworn evidence that “the State of Idaho has incurred the
following expenses and losses as result of the investigation and prosecution of Nora Washburn.”
(Id.) These expenses included 22.40 hours of documented investigation, plus costs for travel, for
a total of $1,024.80 in investigative expenses. (Id.) Progressive Insurance also submitted costs
and expenses incurred as a result of Washburn’s criminal conduct. (See R., pp. 120-124;
10/12/17 Tr., p. 228, Ls. 3-11.) Progressive suffered $3,697.03 in expenses as a result of
Washburn’s criminal conduct. (See id.) The total amount of restitution sought was $4,721.11.
(See id.)
When given an opportunity to respond to the two restitution requests, instead of objecting
or challenging the evidence, Washburn only asked the court for more time. (10/12/17 Tr., p. 235,
Ls. 10-15.) The district court ordered Washburn to pay $4,721.11 in restitution. (10/12/17 Tr.,
p. 239, Ls. 6-9; R., pp. 118-119.) On appeal Washburn argues that this order of restitution did
not comply with legal standards and was an abuse of discretion. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 1319.)
As an initial matter, Washburn’s argument is not preserved for appeal. An argument not
raised before the district court should not be considered on appeal. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez,
162 Idaho 271, 275-276, 396 P.3d 700, 704-705 (2017) (constitutionality of arrest was not
preserved for appeal because the parties argued a statutory basis for arrest before the district
court). Here, the only argument raised by Washburn was an argument to allow her more time
before she responded to the restitution request. (10/12/17 Tr., p. 235, Ls. 10-15.) Washburn did
not make any other argument. (See id.) Further, even after the district court implicitly denied
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her request for more time and ordered restitution, Washburn did not file any motion for
reconsideration or otherwise challenge the restitution amount. Washburn did not raise any of
these arguments before the district court; therefore, these arguments are not preserved for appeal
and should not be considered by this Court.
Even if Washburn’s arguments are considered by this Court, Washburn has failed to show
the district court did not comply with relevant legal standards and abused its discretion.
Washburn argues that the restitution statutes did not allow restitution to Progressive Insurance
because “there was no financial loss because Progressive never paid Ms. Washburn or the other
driver for Ms. Washburn’s fraudulent claim.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) Contrary to Washburn’s
argument, the restitution statutes are not limited to only reimbursing an insurance company for
paying out on fraudulent claims.
Idaho Code § 41-293 provides that anyone found guilty under this section “shall be
ordered to make restitution to the insurer or any other person for any financial loss sustained as a
result of a violation of this section.” I.C. § 41-293(4). The definition of “financial loss”
explicitly includes more than claims payments, it also includes “out-of-pocket and other
expenses.” I.C. § 41-291(8).
(8) “Financial loss” includes, but is not limited to, loss of earnings, out-of-pocket
and other expenses, repair and replacement costs and claims payments.
I.C. § 41-291(8). In addition, the definition of “economic loss” under the general restitution
statute also includes “direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses.” See I.C. § 19-5304. Thus, under
both Idaho Code §§ 41-293 and 19-5304 Progressive Insurance was not limited to only seeking
reimbursement for payments for fraudulent claims, but was able to seek restitution for any
expenses related to that fraudulent claim. That is what Progressive did here. Progressive
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submitted a breakdown of its expenses associated with Washburn’s fraudulent claim and the
district court ordered restitution based upon those expenses. (See R., pp. 120-124.) These
expenses included investigative costs and costs associated with sending witnesses to Idaho to
testify at trial. (Id.) The district court acted consistently with applicable legal principles when it
ordered restitution to Progressive.
The district court also properly awarded restitution for the costs to the State for the
investigation and prosecution of Nora Washburn. (See R., pp. 116-117; 10/12/17 Tr., p. 228, Ls.
3-11.) Washburn argues that prosecution costs are not authorized by the statute. (See R., pp. 1718.) Washburn’s argument is not supported by the language of the statute or the record in this
case.
Idaho Code § 41-295(6) provides: “The investigation section shall be permitted to seek
court ordered restitution as reimbursement, for the cost of investigation from those individuals
successfully prosecuted under section 41-293, Idaho Code.” I.C. § 41-295(6). The investigation
section is required to refer criminal violations to a prosecutor and the prosecutor is required to
prosecute “against such person as the information may require or justify.” I.C. § 41-295(4).
First, the affidavit submitted by the investigation section did not seek any restitution for
any hourly rate incurred by the prosecutor for prosecuting the case. (See R., pp. 116-117.) The
$1,024.08 in restitution sought appears to be for the investigation section – not the hourly costs
incurred by the prosecutor in prosecuting the case. Second, Washburn’s argument that the term
“investigation” does not extend to an investigator’s role in a trial ignores common sense and the
language of the statute. The statute provides that restitution can be ordered after an individual
has been “successfully prosecuted.” I.C. § 41-295(6). The statute contemplates, as is common
and necessary practice, that an investigator will be involved in the prosecution of the defendant.
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The only way an investigation can conclude with a successful prosecution is by including the
investigation in the prosecution and trial process.
Even if the term “investigation” does not extend to the investigator’s role in the trial, the
affidavit clearly provides that the $557.09 was incurred due to “Documented investigative
hours.” (R., p. 117.) Thus, even if the district court abused its discretion in awarding the entire
$1,024.08, the investigation section should still be reimbursed $557.09 for the documented
investigative hours. However, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded
restitution based upon an affidavit detailing the “expenses and losses as a result of the
investigation and prosecution of Nora Washburn.” Washburn has failed to show the district
court abused its discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 9th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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